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MORAL COUNSELING
Deborah L. Rhode*
INTRODUCTION
Do lawyers have a moral responsibility to provide moral counseling? It
depends who you ask. This is not a moment when most audiences need
convincing about the need for greater moral responsibility in American
business and in the professions that advise it. With estimates of recent
financial scandals running as high as $7 trillion and public trust of
management at new lows, a consensus has emerged that Something Must Be
Done.' In a recent poll on public confidence in some twenty major
institutions, Americans rated "big business" second to last: Only about
one-fifth expressed high levels of confidence. 2 When asked "how much of
the time do you think you can trust the executives in charge of major
companies in this country to do what is right," only one percent said
always, and only about a fifth said most of the time; about a quarter said
almost never. 3 Only ten percent thought that current rules designed to
promote responsible and ethical corporate behavior were working "pretty
well"; almost half thought they needed "major changes" or a "complete
overhaul." 4
Lawyers are among the few constituencies in denial about the need for
fundamental reform. As William Simon notes, the most frequent response
of the profession has been to "circl[e] the wagons" around traditional
standards. 5 The American Bar Association (ABA) has largely resisted
efforts to strengthen corporate counsels' responsibility to prevent client
misconduct. It vehemently opposed federal statutory proposals to that end,
which were nonetheless enacted with nearly universal congressional
* Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law, Director, Stanford Center on Ethics. The research
assistance of Mariko Hirose is gratefully acknowledged.
1. Peter S. Cohan, Value Leadership: The 7 Principles that Drive Corporate Value in
Any Economy 4 (2003).
2. Frank Newport, Military, Police Top Gallup's Annual Confidence in Institutions
Poll, Gallup Poll Monthly, June 19, 2003, at 32, available at
http://institution.gallup.com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0306033.
3. Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion Research, Survey by Los Angeles Times, Mar. 27-30,
2004, iPoll Databank, Apr. 1, 2004, www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html.
4. Roper Ctr. for Pub. Opinion Research & Peter D. Hart Research Assocs., iPoll
Databank, Aug. 29, 2002, www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ipoll.html.
5. William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional
Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1453, 1453 (2006).
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approval as part of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 6 The ABA, as well as
state counterparts, continues to challenge attempts to expand lawyers' moral
oversight responsibilities that might compromise client interests. 7
On the general subject of moral counseling, the bar's position is more
ambivalent. As bar ethics codes have long recognized, ethical
considerations may affect how laws are interpreted and enforced, so advice
about those concerns may be part of an attorney's general obligation of
competent representation. 8 Accordingly, Model Rule 2.1 of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that "[i]n rendering advice,
a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
client's situation." 9 Yet as the comment to that Rule is at pains to point out,
lawyers are "not ... moral advisor[s] as such."' 0 And many practitioners
are wary of appearing to "pass judgment" on their clients. I I
Despite long-standing controversies concerning the role of moral
counseling, we know little about its nature, extent, and frequency. In the
single empirical survey most directly on point, only two percent of lawyers
recalled giving advice on the "public interest." 12 Yet much of the moral
counseling that lawyers provide is not presented as such, and may not even
be perceived in those terms by lawyers themselves. Indeed, as case
histories suggest, many professionals, particularly those in business
settings, prefer to cast any ethical advice in pragmatic form. 13 Conduct that
attorneys find ethically objectionable can be more diplomatically packaged
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. III 2003); see also 17
C.F.R. 205 (2003). The legislation passed with a vote of 423-3. See Deborah L. Rhode &
Paul D. Patton, Lawyers, Ethics and Enron, in Enron: Corporate Fiascos and Their
Implications 625, 628 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). For bar
opposition, see id. at 645; Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's
Struggle with the SEC, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1236 (2003).
7. For the focus of the ABA Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, see Molly
McDonough, Prove It: Task Force Seeks Evidence that Recent Policies Undermine
Attorney-Client Privilege, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2005, at 60. For California and Washington State
Bar committees' challenges to the SEC regulations that implement Sarbanes-Oxley
requirements, see Corps. Comm. of the Bus. Law Section and Comm. on Prof'I
Responsibility and Conduct, Cal. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Alert: The New SEC Attorney Conduct
Rules v. California's Duty of Confidentiality (2004), available at
http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/SEC-ethics-alert.pdf, Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Background on
the Proposed Interim Formal Ethics Opinion 1 (2003).
8. Model Rules of Prof 1 Conduct R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (2004) (noting that "[ajlthough a
lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most
legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be applied").
9. Id. R. 2.1.
10. Id. R. 2.1 cmt.
11. That view has dominated debates about the formulation and revision of bar ethical
standards. For the role of such arguments in the initial drafts of the ABA Model Rules, see
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, 620-21
(1985).
12. Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values
and Client Relationships in the Large Firm, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 533 (1985).
13. Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers 6 (1988).
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as unduly risky, as something that will not play well with jurors,
government regulators, the media, or the general public. By the same
token, the moral high road can also be portrayed as desirable for prudential
reasons. In the long term, attorneys can often argue, "ethics pays"; the
value of a reputation for fairness and integrity and the ability to forestall
more intrusive regulation will outweigh short-term financial costs. 14
This strategy, however, has its limitations. Not all moral advice can be
prudentially framed. If virtue were always its own reward, we would surely
see more of it in the business world. As experts on corporate social
responsibility note, "ethics counts," but whether it also "pays" depends on
social and legal conditions that are sometimes lacking.' 5 Much turns on the
adequacy of enforcement and penalty structures for harmful conduct, and
the strength of peer support for desirable behavior.16
This essay argues that lawyers have a moral responsibility to provide
moral counseling, whether or not it can be packaged in pragmatic terms.
Although in today's political climate, this proposition would hardly seem
controversial to the general public, it has proven hard to institutionalize
among lawyers. Two aspects of this responsibility have been especially
problematic. The first is that lawyers, as fiduciaries for clients, have a
moral obligation to provide informed, independent, and disinterested legal
advice. Although this obligation is widely accepted in theory, it is too
seldom realized in practice. A second obligation follows from lawyers' role
as officers of the court and fiduciaries for the legal system. Lawyers should
counsel clients to comply with the purposes and letter of the law, and with
core principles of honesty, fairness, and social responsibility that are central
to effective legal processes. This is not an obligation that is well-
established even in principle, let alone practice. Yet it is crucial to
maintaining a just society, committed to the rule of law, and a profession
worthy of regulatory autonomy and public respect.
This understanding of lawyers' moral responsibility is not tied to any
single monolithic conception of "the client" as either Holmes's
quintessential "bad man" or H.L.A. Hart's "law abiding citizen. 1 7 Rather,
the framework seeks to encompass the broad range of contexts in which
14. For the frequency with which this argument is made, see Deborah L. Rhode, Where
Is the Leadership in Moral Leadership?, in Moral Leadership: The Theory and Practice of
Power, Judgment, and Policy 1 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2006). For the value of preempting
regulation, see Cynthia A. Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1629,
1635-49 (2006).
15. Lynn Sharp Paine, Value Shift: Why Companies Must Merge Social and Financial
Imperatives to Achieve Superior Performance 30 (2003); see also David Vogel, The Market
for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility 6 (2005); Rhode,
supra note 14, at 19-20.
16. See Paine, supra note 15, at 30-31; Vogel, supra note 15, at 4; Kimberly D. Krawiec,
Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader Mystery, 79 Or. L. Rev. 301, 310
(2000); Rhode, supra note 14, at 19-20.
17. See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 256 (2d ed. 1994); Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897).
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legal counseling occurs. Clients bring to these settings quite different
vulnerabilities, desires, and moral sensitivities. Any unitary, preconceived
view of their essential human nature cannot capture the diversity of legal
practice. Nor can it take account of the complexities of most corporate
counseling, in which obligations run to entities, not individuals. What
morally responsible lawyers require is not some fixed assumption about
clients' ethics, but rather a firm commitment to their own, and a
professional culture that reinforces this commitment in practice.
I. THE NEED FOR MORAL COUNSELING
Few would dispute the need for greater checks on client misconduct and
the legal profession's too frequent failure to perform this role. Lawyers
have been implicated in almost all of the major health, safety, and financial
scandals of recent decades.' 8 Where controversy centers is on the extent to
which more moral counseling could have significantly reduced that
misconduct. As the discussion below indicates, in many cases, clients
plainly ignored or discounted lawyers' efforts to prevent misconduct, or left
them out of the loop of information and decision making that might have
permitted such efforts in the first instance. 19 But in other cases, lawyers
remained willfully ignorant or made no serious attempt to engage in
compliance counseling. 20  Whether they would have been successful
remains speculative, but both clients and the public deserved an effort.
The same is true in many counseling contexts outside the corporate
setting. The stress, acrimony, and financial pressures that can accompany
legal disputes often compromise clients' ability to perceive their own long-
term interests or the ethical implications of self-serving behavior.21 As
Elihu Root famously put it, "About half the practice of a decent lawyer
consists in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and should
stop."2 2 At the very least, lawyers can provide a useful reality check for
individuals whose judgment is skewed by self-interest or cognitive biases.
And in organizational contexts, attorneys can serve an equally important
18. For a representative list, see Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice (2000)
[hereinafter, Rhode, Interests of Justice]; Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The
Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1185 (2003); David Luban, Contrived
Ignorance, 87 Geo. L. Rev. 957 (1999) [hereinafter Luban, Contrived Ignorance]; David
Luban, Making Sense of Moral Meltdowns, in Moral Leadership: The Theory and Practice
of Power, Judgment, and Policy, supra note 14, at 57 [hereinafter Luban, Making Sense];
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics in Counseling, 30 Pepp. L. Rev. 591, 602 (2003) [hereinafter
Rhode, Ethics in Counseling]; William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity:
Lawyer Responsibilitiesfor Collective Misconduct, 22 Yale J. on Reg. 1 (2005).
19. See infra notes 32, 59 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 18; Koniak, supra note 6; Luban, Contrived Ignorance,
supra note 18; Rhode & Patton, supra note 6; Simon, supra note 18.
21. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics 515-37, 53940, 708-27
(4th ed. 2004).
22. Philip C. Jessup, 1 Elihu Root 133 (1938).
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function by enlisting others, such as independent directors, who may have a
more disinterested perspective.
A wide array of research evidence documents the role of cognitive biases
in distorting individual judgment on health, safety, and financial matters
that may pose ethical concerns. Two related problems involve
overconfidence and overcommitment. Those who obtain decision-making
positions often have high confidence in their own capacities and
judgment. 23 That can readily lead to arrogance, overoptimism, and an
escalation of commitment to choices that turn out to be wrong, either
factually or morally.24 As a result, individuals may ignore or suppress
dissent, overestimate their ability to rectify adverse consequences, and
cover up mistakes by denying, withholding, or sometimes destroying
information.25 An incremental slide into ever more dubious conduct can
readily produce "the boiled frog" problem. 26 A frog thrown into boiling
water will jump out of the pot. A frog placed in tepid water that gradually
becomes hotter and hotter will calmly boil to death. 27
A Dilbert cartoon parodies the process in a corporate ethics context. One
of the main characters tells his supervisor that he has discovered a "deadly
safety flaw" in a company product and wants to know "[w]ho should I
inform?" 28 The answer comes back: "No one. The stock would plunge
and we'd have massive layoffs. Your career would be ruined." 29 "But,"
responds the employee, "my negligence could cause the deaths of a dozen
customers." 30 To which his boss reassuringly responds, "The first dozen is
always the hardest. '31
23. Kathleen Hoffman Lambird & Traci Mann, When Do Ego Threats Lead to Self-
Regulation Failure? Negative Consequences of Defensive High Self-Esteem, 32 Personality
& Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1179, 1179 (2006); Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational
Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 968, 971 (2002).
24. See Max H. Bazerman, Judgment in Managerial Decision Making 37-39 (2002);
Martin E.P. Seligman, Learned Optimism 100-12 (1990); John M. Darley, How
Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in Codes of Conduct: Behavioral
Research into Business Ethics 13, 16-25 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds.,
1996); Langevoort, supra note 23, at 974; David M. Messick & Max H. Bazerman, Ethical
Leadership and the Psychology of Decision Making, 37 Sloan Mgmt. Rev. 9 (1996); Michael
B. Metzger, Bridging the Gaps: Cognitive Constraints on Corporate Control & Ethics
Education, 16 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 435, 475-78 (2005); Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in
the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action, 16
Organizational Behav. & Hum. Performance 27 (1976).
25. See Krawiec, supra note 16, at 310; sources cited supra note 24.
26. John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor's
Perspective, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 57, 93 (2005).
27. Id.
28. Scott Adams, Dilbert (Jan. 27, 2004) (on file with the author and the Fordham Law
Review). I am indebted to David Luban for this cartoon, and for that matter, a great deal
more that informs this essay.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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Other biases can similarly compromise ethical reasoning. One involves
cognitive dissonance-individuals tend to suppress or reconstrue
information that casts doubt on a prior belief or action.32 Such tendencies
may lead clients to discount or devalue evidence of the harms of their
conduct or the extent of their own responsibility. Such skewed assessments
are particularly likely where the victims are distant and diffuse-
shareholders and consumers, not identifiable persons. 33
Self-serving biases compound the problem. Social psychology research
confirms what common sense and common experience suggest. People
have a natural inclination to conflate what is personally advantageous with
what is socially just and ethically justifiable. 34 Self-interest or conflicts of
interest often skew "intuitive judgments," which are not products of
deliberative reasoning. 35 Commitment to initial unreflective decisions then
entraps individuals in an escalating series of ethically indefensible acts. So
too, when decision makers compromise their ethical standards in response
to situational pressures, cognitive bias often kicks in, and standards change
to justify the behavior.3 6 A related dynamic involves "ethical fading."'37 In
order to avoid a conflict between their interests and principles, individuals
are drawn to strategies that bleach out the moral content of their choices.
Tendencies such as adopting euphemistic labels for injurious conduct, or
understating responsibility for acts of omission, allow the ethical
dimensions of decision making to fade from view. 38
Organizational structures can also compromise moral judgment.
Countless studies document the influence of authority figures and peer
pressure in producing actions that individuals find unacceptable under other
circumstances. Stanley Milgram's classic electric shock experiments offer
a chilling reminder of how readily the good go bad if someone in a
32. The classic account is Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 128-34
(1957). For more recent accounts, see Cognitive Dissonance: Progress on a Pivotal Theory,
in Social Psychology (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1999); Metzger, supra note
24, at 466-68, 478-79.
33. Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as
Gatekeeper, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 983, 1033 (2005); Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein,
Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of Conflict of Interest, 17 Soc. Just. Res. 189,
197 (2004); Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the
Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. Risk & Uncertainty 5 (2003).
34. Kim, supra note 33, at 1030-3 1; Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning,
108 Psychol. Bull. 480, 485 (1990); Messick & Bazerman, supra note 24, at 10, 99-100;
Metzger, supra note 24, at 499.
35. John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational
Corruption, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 1177, 1181-84 (2005); Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on
Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality, 58 Am. Psychol. 697, 697-720
(2003).
36. Metzger, supra note 24, at 467. For the classic account, see Elliot Aronson, The
Social Animal 108 (1972).
37. Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-
Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 Soc. Just. Res. 223, 224 (2004).
38. Id. at 224-28, 230.
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seemingly legitimate decision making position demands it.39 Variations of
the study also documented the importance of peer influence. When a
subject was paired with someone who refused to comply, ninety percent
followed suit; when that person uncomplainingly complied, ninety percent
of the subjects did so as well. 40
Other studies on organizational dynamics find similar patterns. Group
loyalty often results in ostracism of inconvenient views and preempts the
moral candor essential for socially responsible decision making.41
Diffusion of responsibility and socialization to expedient norms can
"protect people from their own consciences. ' 42 In some instances, what
psychologists label "pluralistic ignorance" kicks in.43 People who are
reluctant to express moral concern because of their insecure or subordinate
position in a group may misinterpret the silence of others. No one realizes
that their colleagues may be suppressing similar views for similar reasons.44
All of these dynamics make individuals more likely to engage in
unethical conduct when acting with others. This is especially likely in
organizations that place heavy emphasis on loyalty and offer substantial
rewards to "team players." 45  In too many contexts, a kind of worldly
cynicism takes hold, and "conventional morality is widely recognized to be
inappropriate, except as public relations stances." 46
A famous simulation by Wharton Professor Scott Armstrong illustrates
the moral myopia of group decision making. The experiment asked fifty-
seven groups of executives and business students to assume the role of an
imaginary pharmaceutical company's board of directors. Each group
received a fact pattern indicating that one of their company's most
profitable drugs was causing a significant number of "unnecessary" deaths a
year and would likely be banned by regulators in the company's home
39. When asked to administer electric shocks to another participant in the experiment,
about two-thirds of subjects fully complied up to levels marked dangerous, despite the
victim's screams of pain. See Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental
View 3-5 (1974). Yet when the experiment was described to subjects, none believed that
they would comply, and estimates of compliance by others were no more than one in a
hundred. See id. at 27-31; Arthur G. Miller, The Obedience Experiments: A Case Study of
Controversy in Social Science 13, 21 (1986). For an overview of the Milgram work and its
relevance for lawyers, see David Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in Ethics in
Practice: Lawyers' Roles, Responsibilities, and Regulation 94, 96-97 (Deborah L. Rhode
ed., 2000).
40. See Luban, Making Sense, supra note 18, at 73.
41. M.R. Banaji, Max H. Bazerman & D. Chugh, How (Un)Ethical Are You?, 81 Harv.
Bus. Rev. 856, 864 (2003); Messick & Bazerman, supra note 24, at 76.
42. John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration 147 (1989).
43. Dale T. Miller & Cathy McFarland, Pluralistic Ignorance: When Similarity Is
Interpreted as Dissimilarity, 53 J. Personality and Soc. Psychol. 298, 298-305 (1987). For
applications in the corporate context, see Darley, supra note 35, at 1186-87.
44. Darley, supra note 35, at 1186-87.
45. Jackall, supra note 13, at 31; Darley, supra note 35, at 1189-91; Ronald R. Sims &
Johannes Brinkmann, Enron Ethics (Or: Culture Matters More than Codes), 45 J. Bus.
Ethics 243, 247 (2003).
46. Jackall, supra note 13, at 6; Kim, supra note 33, at 1011, 1019.
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country. A competitor offered an alternative medication with the same
benefits at the same price but without the serious side effects. More than
seventy-nine percent of the boards decided to continue marketing their
product and to take legal and political actions to prevent a ban. By contrast,
when a different group of individuals with similar business backgrounds
were asked for their personal views on the same hypothetical, ninety-seven
percent believed that continuing to market the product was socially
irresponsible. 47
Such diffusion of responsibility is often apparent in corporate counseling
settings. A well-known example involves the failure of top officials at
Salomon Brothers to report or take prompt corrective action against a trader
who submitted false auction bids to evade Treasury Department purchase
limits. Four executives, including the general counsel, knew of the
misconduct and failed to act for several months. According to findings by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, each of these officials "placed
responsibility for investigating [and curbing the trader's] conduct ... on
someone else." 48  No one lived happily ever after, and the lawyer's
abdication of an ethical counseling role was part of the reason.49
Equally unhappy endings result from conflicts of interest. Problems
frequently arise when organizations can benefit at the expense of their
clients. Michael Lewis's Liar's Poker offers an example from his training
period as a bond salesman at Salomon Brothers.50 After an experienced
colleague recommended AT&T bonds, he sold some $3 million to one
customer. Their value plummeted, undermining his relationship with the
client. Lewis then learned from another salesman that the firm had
predicted the drop in value and wanted to unload its inventory on
unsuspecting clients. When Lewis protested, the salesman responded,
"Look, who do you work for, this guy or Salomon Brothers?" 51
A related set of conflicts involve "principal-agent" problems. These arise
in corporate settings where managers' desire to maximize their own
income, power, or status encourages decisions inconsistent with the interest
of owners and other stakeholders. The problem is particularly apparent
where compensation and advancement are too closely tied to short term
profits. 52 Such skewed reward structures help explain the moral meltdowns
47. J. Scott Armstrong, Social Irresponsibility in Management, 5 J. of Bus. Res. 185,
185 (1977).
48. In re Gutfreund, 51 S.E.C. 93, 98 (1992).
49. The result was a major financial crisis when the threat of a public investigation
ultimately forced disclosure. The firm's share price plummeted, many clients withdrew their
business, a government lawsuit imposed almost $300 million in penalties and the president
and the CEO were forced to resign. See Paine, supra note 15, at 9-12.
50. Michael Lewis, Liar's Poker 164-67 (1989).
51. Id. at 167.
52.. David Skeel, Icarus in the Boardroom: The Fundamental Flaws in Corporate
America and Where They Came From 152-55 (2005); Rhode, supra note 14, at 31-32.
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on display in cases like Enron and its predecessors during the savings and
loan crisis of the 1990s. 53
Where were the lawyers? asked federal judge Stanley Sporkin in one of
those savings and loan debacles. 54 Similar questions are being asked about
counsel in the latest spate of scandals. Although there is much we do not
know, what evidence is available suggests that lawyers missed all too many
opportunities to advise boards of directors and top decision makers about
serious ethical concerns and to avoid pedigreeing transactions that were, at
best, on the fringes of fraud. 55 As these examples suggest, the ultimate
justification for an ethical dimension to legal counseling is that there is no
alternative; often, no one besides a lawyer is in a position to identify and
prevent actions that pose significant threats to the public welfare. If
attorneys fail to play that role, then, as David Luban notes, illegal and
injurious actions can "fly beneath enforcement's radar for years on end." 56
What kind of counseling is necessary and what gets in the way deserve
closer analysis.
II. OBLIGATIONS TO CLIENTS: INFORMED, INDEPENDENT, AND
DISINTERESTED ADVICE
Lawyers' obligation to provide informed, independent, and disinterested
counsel confronts obstacles on two levels. Even with the best of intentions,
attorneys, like any decision makers, are subject to cognitive biases, peer
pressures, and information barriers that compromise counseling
responsibilities. Attorneys are also subject to common human temptations
to give priority to their own financial, reputational, and related interests
when they conflict with those of clients. Although these problems are by
no means unique to legal practice, what is distinctively disturbing about the
bar's response is its failure to develop organizational and regulatory
structures that could check the worst abuses.
53. Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing
Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (2003); Sims & Brinkmann, supra note 45, at 250-51.
For a general overview of the Enron fall, see Kroger, supra note 26, at 69-84; see also
Langevoort, supra note 23, at 972. For general discussion of the savings and loan crisis, see
sources cited in Rhode & Luban, supra note 21, at 287-97, and William H. Simon, The Kaye
Scholer Affair: The Lawyers' Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and
Apology, 23 Law & Soc. Inquiry 243, 246-51 (1998). For an account of the biases leading to
lawyers' complicity, see Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral
Inquiry into Lawyers'Responsibility for Clients'Fraud, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 75 (1993).
54. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990).
55. See sources cited supra note 53.
56. David Luban, Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., A Different Nightmare and a
Different Dream, Paper Presentation at the Fordham University School of Law Symposium:
The Internal Point of View in Law and Ethics (Feb. 10, 2006). For the reasons that other
professionals fail as gatekeepers and the rationale for requiring lawyers to serve that
function, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103
Colum. L. Rev. 1293, 1305-07 (2003).
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A. Informed Advice
Lawyers' efforts to provide informed advice face challenges along two
dimensions. As decision makers, lawyers are subject to the same cognitive
biases as clients. As agents, they may lack access to key information, either
because clients do not provide it or cannot afford the strategies necessary to
obtain it.
For example, once lawyers have undertaken to help a client realize a
certain objective, commitment biases and tendencies to reduce cognitive
dissonance may lead them to discount evidence that should raise ethical
concerns. 5 7 Psychological research and case histories consistently find that
simply assigning individuals to take an advocacy position increases their
personal support for that position. 58 As a result, lawyers who receive such
assignments may undervalue information inconsistent with client
objectives.
A further problem involves the fragmentation of information. The size
and structure of bureaucratic institutions and the complexity of the issues
involved may work against informed ethical judgments. In many of the
recent scandals, as well as earlier financial, health, safety, and
environmental disasters, a large number of the upper-level participants,
including lawyers, were not well informed. 59 In some instances, the reason
may have been willful blindness: Keeping one's eyes demurely averted is a
handy skill, particularly when the alternative might be civil or criminal
liability.60 In other cases, the client's leaders did not want informed advice;
they wanted legal pedigrees for transactions, and the less said about them,
the better.6' In a third category of cases, the problem has had more to do
with organizational structures and practices. Work is allocated in ways that
prevent key players from seeing the full picture, and channels for
expressing concerns about the information that is available are inadequate.
Shooting the messenger was the standard response to unwelcome tidings in
57. See Langevoort, supra note 53, at 95-105; sources cited supra notes 24 and 32.
58. For a general review of social psychology literature as it relates to advocacy, see
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1499 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort,
Ego, Human Behavior and Law, 81 Va. L. Rev. 853 (1995); and David Luban, Integrity: Its
Causes and Cures, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 279 (2003). For case histories, see Lon L. Fuller,
Philosophy for the Practicing Lawyer, in Principles of Social Order 285-87 (Kenneth I.
Winston ed., 1981); Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, "It's Hard to Be a Human Being
and a Lawyer": Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal
Practice, 105 W. Va. L. Rev. 495 (2003).
59. Kroger, supra note 26, at 97, 98; Luban, Making Sense, supra note 18, at 70;
Messick & Darley, supra note 24, at 14-15; Jeffrey Sonnenfeld & Paul R. Lawrence, Why
Do Companies Succumb to Price Fixing?, in Ethics in Practice: Managing the Moral
Corporation 184, 191 (Kenneth R. Andrews & Donald K. David eds., 1989).
60. Luban, Contrived Ignorance, supra note 18, at 976-80; Simon, supra note 18, at 15-
17; Luban, supra note 56.
61. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 1201; Luban, Contrived Ignorance, supra note 18, at
979; Simon, supra note 18, at 17-20.
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cases like Enron, and ultimately, it was not just the messenger who paid the
price.62
Related problems arise when clients cannot afford the kind of factual
investigation and legal research necessary for effective counseling. In the
vast majority of cases involving indigents, crushing caseloads or
ludicrously low statutory fees make adequate representation an unaffordable
luxury. 63 Court-appointed counsel with dockets four to eight times the
ABA's recommended ceiling often advise defendants on plea agreements
with only minutes of consultation and no factual investigation. 64 "Cooling
out" the client is a common technique: Defendants' expectations are
revised downward to spare overworked or undercompensated attorneys the
risk of trial.65 The price is paid in human liberty. In civil contexts, the
United States spends only about $2.25 per person annually on legal aid,
which comes nowhere close to meeting the needs of the seventh of the
population poor enough to qualify for assistance. 66 At these resource
levels, triage is inevitable, and extensive counseling is more often an
aspiration than an achievement. Similar problems can arise in
representation of other clients of limited means where the financial stakes
do not justify adequate preparation. A little knowledge may be a dangerous
thing, but it too often is all either lawyers or clients feel able to afford.
B. Independent and Disinterested Advice
Bar ethics codes and related case law have long proclaimed clients' right
to independent and disinterested counsel. Rules of professional conduct
include detailed prohibitions on conflicts of interest, including bans on
representation of a client where "there is a significant risk" that the lawyer's
assistance will be "materially limited" by the obligations to other clients,
third parties, or by the lawyer's own "personal interest[s]. ''67  Such
prohibitions are notoriously underenforced. Despite their best intentions,
lawyers inevitably have loyalties to peers, supervisors, and employing
organizations that can compromise independent judgment.
Obvious problems arise from the principal-agent conflicts noted earlier.
Ethical rules insist that lawyers employed or retained by organizations
represent the organization. 68  But as Simon notes, although attorneys
recognize in principle that "the corporation is not the same thing as its
management," in practice "they have no clear conception of what else it
62. See Sims & Brinkmann, supra note 45, at 252-53.
63. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice 61-63, 122-28 (2004); Rhode & Luban, supra
note 21, at 309-10, 844-46.
64. Rhode, supra note 63, at 126-28.
65. The phrase comes from Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence
Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 Law & Soc'y Rev. 15, 28 (1967).
66. Rhode, supra note 63, at 106.
67. Model Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 1.7(a) (2004).
68. Id. R. 1.13 (2004).
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could be."' 69 Financial realities dictate that lawyers generally act in ways
acceptable to the individuals responsible for their employment. Only in a
very narrow range of circumstances, involving legal violations likely to
injure the organization, do attorneys have any obligation to question
management decisions. 70 In other circumstances, according to the ABA's
Model Rules, lawyers "ordinarily" should abide by those decisions even if
"their utility or prudence is doubtful."' 7 1 Such standards, coupled with all
the psychological pressures for group loyalty and obedience to authority
noted earlier, can readily work against independent advice.
Similar conflicts of interest can arise in other contexts in which lawyers
are retained and compensated by third parties, rather than clients. Insurance
and organized crime cases are common illustrations. In theory, lawyers
counseling defendants owe them undivided allegiance on matters such as
whether to accept a settlement or plea agreement. In practice, lawyers who
give no thought to how their representation will sit with employers are
likely to need another line of work.72
Other reputational concerns, whether conscious or unconscious, can
similarly skew attorneys' advice. Case studies of lawyers working in small
towns or handling small consumer claims have found that these
practitioners frequently curtail their representation; counseling clients to
accept a modest settlement avoids antagonizing the business community
likely to supply or refer future work. 73 Criminal defense lawyers' need to
maintain good relationships with prosecutors and judges may affect their
recommendations to individual clients. 74 Public interest lawyers who take a
case in part to gain public visibility and establish an important precedent
may have difficulty providing impartial advice about the merits of a quiet
settlement or a partial remedy.75 Ideological differences between clients
and counsel can compound the problem. As Derek Bell once observed,
"Idealism, though perhaps rarer than greed, is harder to control."' 76
69. Simon, supra note 5, at 1454.
70. Model Rule 1.13(b) provides that if the lawyers know of a possible legal violation
that might be "imputed to the organization" and is "likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization," they must proceed "as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization," which may include a report to its highest governing body. Model Rules of
Prof I Conduct R. 1.13. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires lawyers for organizations
that issue public securities to report material legal violations up the chain of command. See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. III 2003); see also 17 C.F.R.
205 (2003).
71. Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 1.13 cmt. 3.
72. For such conflicts of interest, see Model Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 1.7, 1.8; Rhode
& Luban, supra note 21, at 562-68, 580-82.
73. Donald D. Landon, Country Lawyers: The Impact of Context on Professional
Practice 136, 142 (1990); Richard Abel, Revisioning Lawyers, in Lawyers in Society: An
Overview 1, 6 (Richard Abel & Philip Lewis eds., 1995); Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and
Consumer Protection Laws, 14 Law & Soc'y Rev. 115, 136-41 (1979).
74. See Rhode, supra note 63, at 128.
75. See Rhode & Luban, supra note 21, at 646-48, 652-55.
76. Derek A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470, 504 (1976).
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But coping with greed poses its own set of challenges. The fee structure
of private practice frequently pits lawyers' financial interests against those
of their clients. Lawyers billing at hourly rates may benefit from expanding
work to fit the time available, and their advice about productive litigation
strategies or early settlements may reflect those biases. Attorneys working
on contingent fees have different incentives but no less risk of conflicts of
interest. Their objective lies in gaining the "highest possible return on their
work"; their clients' goal is the "highest possible recovery." 77
The point of these examples is not to compile an exhaustive catalogue of
potential lawyer-client conflicts. Rather, it is to underscore an obvious but
often overlooked point: In some sense, all counseling is moral counseling.
Fiduciary obligations to clients pose responsibilities on lawyers to suspend
their own interests. In this respect, the counseling process has an ethical
dimension even when it has no explicitly ethical content. Failure to provide
informed, independent, and disinterested advice is a moral failure
demanding a moral, as well as regulatory, response. What that entails will,
of course, depend on context. Part IV suggests a number of general
strategies, which emphasize the need for lawyers, both individually and
collectively, to pay more attention to the forces that impair advice. Total
objectivity and full information are unattainable ideals, but neither have we
reached the limit of what is realistic to .expect from a self-regulating
profession.
III. OBLIGATIONS TO THE PUBLIC: COUNSELING AS A COMMON GOOD
Although American lawyers have long acknowledged some obligations
beyond those to clients, the extent of those obligations in the counseling
context has been subject to dispute. Bar ethics codes and related legal
prohibitions impose only minimal demands. Lawyers may not, for
example, knowingly assist the perpetration of fraud on a tribunal or a third
party; they may not counsel individuals to give false testimony or to
unlawfully conceal or destroy evidence. 78  But beyond these basic
prohibitions, the bar's rules of professional conduct impose no ethical
responsibilities in counseling. The farthest they go, as noted earlier, is
permission for lawyers to include moral considerations as part of their
advice and to report probable legal violations to higher authorities. What is
most instructive is what is missing. The Model Rules do not suggest that
lawyers even should include ethical concerns, encourage legal compliance,
or advise their clients to adhere to standards of honesty, fair dealing, and
social responsibility. The recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley legislation
supplements lawyers' internal reporting obligations but does not impose
broader ethical obligations. 79
77. Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 175.
78. Model Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 3.4 (2004).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7. The inadequacies of the legislation have
been widely noted in Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and
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Nor does much of the leading commentary on counseling reinforce such
obligations. According to one influential "client-centered" approach,
lawyers should raise considerations that implicate a client's ethical values
but should refrain from introducing their own values. The premise is that
respect for individual dignity and autonomy demands deference to the
client's objectives. Unless their decision "violates the law or is clearly
immoral... client values [should] prevail."' 80 This approach is problematic
on multiple levels. As a factual matter, lawyers may not have a good grasp
of a client's values, particularly before they raise moral considerations.
When the client is an organization, there is no authoritative way of
determining its values. Stakeholders have multiple, often competing
interests, and for reasons noted earlier, managers' concerns are not
necessarily a good proxy for those of their employer.
Moreover, from an ethical standpoint, an unqualified priority on client
interests is impossible to justify, particularly when the client is an
organization. Why should the autonomy and dignity only of clients matter?
A corporation's "right" to maximize profits through unsafe or misleading-
but imperfectly regulated-methods can hardly take ethical precedence over
other individuals' right to be free from reasonably avoidable risks. As
gatekeepers in imperfect legal processes, lawyers have obligations that
transcend those owed to any particular client. Honesty, trust, and fairness
are collective goods; neither legal nor market systems can function
effectively if lawyers assume no social responsibility for the consequences
of their counseling role.
A. Lawyers' Resistance
In resisting broader social responsibilities in counseling, lawyers raise
two primary objections. The first is that it is not their role. Where clients'
rights are at stake, they deserve a zealous advocate, not a super ego or
government watchdog. Lawyers' function is to defend, not judge, those
they represent; they have no standing or special expertise to impose their
view of the "public interest." A second claim is that casting lawyers in the
role of ethical gatekeepers will discourage the trust and candor from clients
that is essential to effective representation. The result will be less
compliance counseling, not more. These arguments have been extensively
criticized elsewhere, and for present purposes, a brief review of their central
weaknesses should suffice. 81
Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 Viii. L. Rev. 725 (2004); Developments
in the Law--Corporations and Society, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2169, 2227, 2246 (2004)
[hereinafter Developments]; Kim, supra note 33, at 1048-52.
80. David A. Binder et al., Lawyers as Counselors: A Client Centered Approach 280,
282 (2d ed. 1991). For similar views and a critique, see Rhode, Ethics in Counseling, supra
note 18, at 604-14.
81. Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, 53-58, 110-14; Gordon, supra note 18, at
1204-07.
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The claim that "it is not the lawyer's role" is an assertion, not an
argument, and begs the question at issue: What should that role be? Nor
can arguments based on clients' right to zealous advocacy be transposed to
counseling contexts where the customary checks on advocacy are absent.
Unlike adversarial proceedings, confidential counseling sessions provide no
opportunities for challenges by opposing advocates and evaluation by
impartial adjudicators. The power balance in these sessions is quite
different than in criminal or civil proceedings involving vulnerable
individuals and powerful opponents, where arguments for zealous advocacy
are strongest. 8 2
The claim that lawyers have no monopoly on determining the "public
interest" and no right to impose it has an appealing air of humility, but it
miscasts the role in question. Effective counselors offer advice; they do not
impose it. Nor do they adopt the tone aptly conveyed by a New Yorker
cartoon that portrayed two monks striding in cloisters as one insisted, "I too
am holier than thou." Lawyers cannot claim to be the final arbiters of the
public interest, but they have some expertise relevant in assessing it. They
are certainly in a position to advise on what would satisfy the purpose and
spirit, as well as letter, of the law. 83 And because lawyers may have less
personal stake than a client in a particular course of action, they may be in a
better position to provide an impartial evaluation of its ethical consequences
and social legitimacy. 84
Moreover, to give moral advice is not to impose it. In many instances,
reasonable views can differ, and attorneys can appropriately defer to clients
who must live with the consequences. Even in other circumstances, where
the moral case seems to the lawyer clear and compelling, the moral
response will simply be withdrawal. As I and others have argued at length
elsewhere, much depends on the relative harms to the client and third
parties and on the attorney's capacity to avert them.85 In these cases, the
result is not to impose the attorney's view, but only the psychological and
financial costs of finding other counsel. That may, at least, trigger a useful
reconsideration of the decision. Even in circumstances in which internal or
external whistleblowing seems the only ethically defensible course, lawyers
may not be imposing their views but simply alerting others of the possible
82. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 58-66 (1988); see Rhode,
Interests of Justice, supra note 18, 55-56; Geoffrey Miller, From Club to Market: The
Evolving Role of Business Lawyers, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1105, 1127 (2005).
83. For the importance on counseling that extends to the purposes, not just the literal
terms, of the law, see William H. Simon, Introduction: The Post-Enron Identity Crisis of the
Business Lawyer, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 947, 953 (2005); see also Robert Gordon, The
Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1988); Gordon, supra note 18, at 1197-1207.
84. For the need for lawyers to present their own ethical views in the course of moral
engagement with clients, see Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19 Geo.
J. Legal Ethics 225, 269 (2006). For a discussion of the value of framing arguments in terms
of their social legitimacy, see Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between Philosophy and
Economics: Legitimacy and Good Corporate Lawyering, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1615 (2006).
85. Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 67.
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need to respond. Given the strong prudential interests cutting against both
withdrawal and whistleblowing, it is unrealistic to suppose that reinforcing
these responsibilities will result in rampant moral imperialism by the bar.
Lawyers' additional claim, that broader social obligations will discourage
client confidences, rests on equally unsupported empirical assumptions.
What little evidence is available casts doubt on the bar's most apocalyptic
predictions. 86 Even if one assumes that clients might be reluctant to confide
in potential whistleblowers, it does not follow that they would feel similarly
about counselors who would maintain confidences. Many individuals now
provide sensitive information without a clear or accurate understanding of
the scope of existing protections. That is particularly true in corporate
counseling, where employees cannot be sure that their statements will be
protected; the privilege belongs to the organization, not to them personally,
and is often waived during government investigations. 87 Even those clients
who might like to withhold compromising information may be unable to do
so, whatever the risks of disclosure. Many individuals will not know what
material would be legally damaging, their lawyer will have other sources
for such information, or their need for informed legal assistance will
outweigh the concerns about confidentiality. Historical, cross-cultural, and
cross-professional data make clear that practitioners have long provided
assistance on sensitive matters without sweeping protections against
disclosure. 88 "Businesses routinely channeled compromising information
to attorneys before courts recognized a corporate privilege and most
European countries manage without one now."'89
B. Lawyers'Interests
Although the bar typically invokes the interests of clients and the public
when resisting broader ethical obligations, the interests of lawyers play
more than a walk-on role. It is obviously inconvenient, both financially and
psychologically, to have responsibilities beyond those to clients who are
footing the bill. That has always been true, but increased competition has
exacerbated the problem. Particularly in corporate contexts, lawyers face
growing pressure to demonstrate "value added" by providing assistance that
translates into short-term profits. 90  Corporate clients, who are facing
increased competition in their own markets, have responded by parceling
out more discrete projects based on competitive considerations rather than
86. For a sample of the arguments, see Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 111;
Simon, supra note 18.
87. Simon, supra note 83, at 949.
88. Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 111.
89. Id.
90. Kim, supra note 33, at 1016; Miller, supra note 82, at 1123; Robert L. Nelson &
Laura Beth Nielson, Cops, Counsel, & Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside
Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 Law & Soc'y Rev. 457, 466 (2000); Robert Eli Rosen,
Risk Management and Corporate Governance: The Case of Enron, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1157,
1169 (2003).
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long-term relationships. That, in turn, has compromised lawyers' ability to
provide candid, informed counseling that may include unwelcome messages
about what law and social responsibility require.91
Competitive pressures within, as well as among, law firms have pushed
in similar directions. Advancement, status, and compensation increasingly
depend on attorneys' capacity to attract and retain lucrative clients. 92 That
makes it correspondingly harder to jeopardize or withdraw from
representation on ethical grounds. Clients' growing tendency to reward
both in-house and outside lawyers with bonuses or equity interests can
provide additional incentives for counseling that props up short-term
earnings at the expense of other values.93
A final consideration that undercuts greater social responsibilities in
counseling involves civil liability. When client misconduct surfaces,
attorneys with deep pockets are an attractive litigation target. Concern
about third-party lawsuits is the elephant in the room when bar ethics rules
are debated. Understandable though that concern may be, it is scarcely
conducive to an unbiased assessment of the public interest in counseling
standards. Any serious attempt to institutionalize greater moral
responsibility will require greater pressure from sources outside the
organized bar.
IV. STRATEGIES FOR REFORM
Improving the climate for moral counseling will require strategies on
both the individual and institutional level. Lawyers need to assume more
personal responsibility for providing informed, independent, and
disinterested advice to clients. Such advice should include considerations
that serve societal as well as client interests. Rather than asking only
whether a given course of conduct is arguably legal, lawyers should ask:
"Is it fair?" "Is it honest?" "Is it socially legitimate?" "Does it thwart the
purpose of the law or pose unreasonable risks?" The regulatory and
organizational structure of practice must provide more support and
incentives for lawyers to meet these standards in counseling and more
sanctions for those who do not.
To that end, individual lawyers need to become more effective monitors
of their own advice. Because so many biases operate on subconscious
levels, it is often difficult for individuals to gauge the factors that may skew
judgment. The problem is compounded in circumstances of moral
ambiguity, where values are in conflict, facts are contested or incomplete,
and realistic options are limited. Yet while there may be no indisputably
"right" answers, some will be more right than others-more informed by
91. Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 30; Miller, supra note 82, at 1117-18,
1121-26.
92. Miller, supra note 82, at 1121-26.
93. Kim, supra note 33, at 1005-07. For equity interests, see Rhode & Luban, supra
note 21, at 664.
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available evidence, more consistent with widely accepted principles, and
more responsive to all the interests at issue.
Although there are no wholly adequate correctives for cognitive biases, it
can help to make individuals more aware of compromising influences and
to provide them with more strategies and opportunities to evaluate their
own reasoning. 94 For example, David Luban suggests that when lawyers'
advice reaches the result that a client wants, they should ask themselves
whether the advice would be the same if the client asked the identical
question but wanted a different outcome. 95 Robert Gordon proposes that
lawyers consider whether a fair minded, fully-informed observer, or a judge
committed to serving the law's societal objectives, would find their position
persuasive. 96 Many business ethics experts suggest a variation on those
questions: "How would it feel to defend that position on the evening
news?" 97 Under those tests, much of the legal advice that lawyers provided
in cases like Enron could not have passed muster. 98
However, neither will such tests always be sufficient. Given the
influence of self-serving biases even when lawyers are aware of the effects,
it is also important to build in opportunities for a second opinion. 99
Everyone's moral compass benefits from external checks. No ethically
sensitive (or even reasonably prudent) attorney should follow the example
of Vinson & Elkins, which agreed to review the propriety of Enron
transactions in which its own services had been used. 100 More lawyers
should be willing to consult their organization's ethics committees, or
suggest that clients seek another view on matters where the lawyers' own
interests are strongly implicated. More attorneys should also be prepared to
confront colleagues or blow the whistle on conduct that fails to satisfy
minimum ethical standards. Much of the problematic counseling that
occurred in recent scandals was the product less of conscious venality than
of moral insensitivity or indifference. Too many lawyers failed to
94. Bazerman, supra note 24, at 3, 168-70; Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: Science and
Practice 90, 134, 196 (4th ed. 2004); David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72
Fordham L. Rev. 279, 304-05 (2003); Metzger, supra note 24, at 547-59; Rhode, supra note
14, at 36-37, 47-50.
95. Luban, supra note 56.
96. Gordon, supra note 18, at 1211.
97. For variations on these questions and the evening news inquiry, see Paine, supra
note 15, at 225-26; Linda Klebe Trevifio & Gary R. Weaver, Managing Ethics in Business
Organizations: Social Scientific Perspectives 298 (2003). For business lawyers questioning
whether information requires disclosure, Simon proposes a test that asks whether a
reasonable investor would be influenced by the information. Simon, supra note 5, at 1466
n.47; Simon, supra note 18, at 7.
98. For critical reviews of legal advice in Enron, see Cramton, Cohen & Koniak, supra
note 79; Gordon, supra note 18; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 Fordham L. Rev.
1139, 1162-80, 1186-1202 (2005); Simon, supra note 18, at 5-11.
99. For a discussion of individuals' tendency to deny that self-serving biases apply to
them, even when confronted by research, see Max H. Bazerman & George Loewenstein,
Taking the Bias Out of Bean Counting, 2001 Harv. Bus. Rev. 28; Kim, supra note 33, at
1029.
100. Rhode & Patton, supra note 6, at 635-36; Simon, supra note 18, at 29.
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appreciate or acknowledge the points at which personal interests and
professional responsibilities diverged. Too many failed to raise
uncomfortable questions with clients and colleagues.
The reasons for those failures underscore problems in institutional design
and suggest a range of possible responses. Legal employers need to
integrate ethical considerations into all organizational functions, including
performance reviews and advancement and compensation decisions. Many
standards that government regulators and compliance experts have
developed for business organizations are equally applicable to legal
employers. For example, under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
corporations can reduce culpability for criminal offenses by promoting "an
organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to
compliance with the law."'' That, in turn, requires providing appropriate
incentives and disciplinary sanctions, as well as opportunities for
employees to seek ethical guidance and make confidential reports of
possible misconduct. Upper-level personnel must have ethics training and
must periodically evaluate compliance programs. 102
More protections for whistleblowing are equally critical. One lawyer
who became unemployable after bearing unwelcome tidings summarized
the prevailing culture: "People think whistle-blowers are great, but they
don't necessarily want one in their organizations."' 1 3 Because the personal
costs of reprisals are particularly great for in-house counsel, who are
dependent on a single client, some experts have recommended changes in
organizational governance structures. One proposal is to make lawyers
accountable to independent directors rather than management. 10 4 How
effective this would prove in practice is open to debate, but further
experimentation and evaluation of reform strategies should be a key
priority. In essence, employers must create more safe spaces for voicing
ethical concerns and provide more tangible rewards for ethical conduct.
Government policymakers and bar regulatory authorities also must
supply more support and pressure for morally responsible counseling. One
obvious example involves greater financial resources for court-appointed
counsel, who now cannot afford to provide effective representation.
Sustained political and legal challenges to state funding structures are part
of the answer; so is additional pro bono assistance in time and money from
the private bar.' 0 5  Another context in which additional positive
reinforcement is necessary involves whistleblowing. Increased statutory
and common law protection against reprisal could encourage lawyers who
101. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.l(a)(2) (2005).
102. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B).
103. John Gibeaut, Telling Secrets, ABA J., Nov. 2004, at 73 (quoting Susan W.
Ausman). For the problems faced by whistleblowers and the inadequacy of current
protections, see Rhode & Luban, supra note 21, at 403-09; Kim, supra note 33, at 1064-65.
104. Kim, supra note 33, at 1055-63.
105. Rhode, supra note 63, at 142-43.
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would like to do the -right thing, but not if the professional price is
prohibitive. 10 6
A related cluster of reforms should center on strengthening ethical
standards and enforcement structures. One step in the right direction would
be enhanced gatekeeping requirements for corporate counsel, such as the
reporting-out rule that the SEC considered as part of its Sarbanes-Oxley
regulations, but withdrew in the wake of massive bar opposition. The
proposed rule would have required attorneys to inform regulators of
material violations of securities law and fraud on the Agency. 10 7 As many
ethics experts note, such a mandatory reporting standard could help slow
the "race to the bottom" that an increasingly competitive legal culture
encourages. '0 8
More stringent ethical requirements and oversight systems are also
urgently needed for indigent defense counsel. Standards governing
effective assistance of counsel are a conceptual embarrassment, and
enforcement ranges from minimal to nonexistent.10 9 Both courts and bar
disciplinary organizations must become much more willing to hold
appointed counsel accountable for counseling that fails to meet basic
standards of competence.
For its part, the legal academic community should assume more
responsibility for promoting moral responsibility. Despite the importance
of moral counseling, we know far too little about how best to secure it, and
do far too little to educate our students about what can undermine it.I 10 The
few works on the subject written by and for practitioners tend to be long on
platitudes and short on data. Even in the best scholarly circles, more ink is
spilled on the value of values than on empirical research suggesting how
best to realize them in practice.
Similar gaps are apparent in law school curricula. Most schools relegate
issues of professional responsibility to a single course that too often offers
106. See Kim, supra note 33, at 1064-65; Gibeaut, supra note 104, at 73; Rhode & Luban,
supra note 21, at 403-09.
107. One version of the noisy withdrawal rule appears at Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. 71670, 71673 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. 205). For a discussion of opposition, see 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6329
(proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 205). A second version appears at 68
Fed. Reg. 6324, 6328 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 205). The final
rule does permit an attorney to make a noisy withdrawal to prevent the issuer from
committing a material violation that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of the issuer or investors. 17 C.F.R. 205.3(d)(2)(i) (2005). Many state
confidentiality rules prohibit disclosure under such circumstances, and the issue of whether
federal regulations preempt state ethical codes is now under dispute. See W. Bradley
Wendel, Professional Responsibility: Examples and Explanations 79-82 (2004).
108. Coffee, supra note 56, at 1306-07; Cramton, Cohen, & Koniak, supra note 79, at
816; Developments, supra note 79, at 2246; Miller, supra note 82, at 1129-30.
109. Rhode, supra note 63, at 131-37.
110. For gaps in research, see Rhode, supra note 14, at 51-53; Trevifio & Weaver, supra
note 97, at 339. For gaps in professional ethics education in law schools and business
schools and strategies for improvement, see Metzger, supra note 24, at 438-49, 555-59;
Rhode, supra note 14, at 47-51.
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"'legal ethics without the ethics."'l Students learn bar ethical rules but
gain little insight about their moral foundations and limitations. Silence in
the core curricula also sends the wrong message. Ethical questions arise in
all fields of legal practice and need to be treated accordingly in legal
education. For faculty to suggest that matters of professional responsibility
are someone else's responsibility encourages future practitioners to do the
same. Adequate treatment of these concerns should involve fewer
shopworn homilies, and more concrete strategies for recognizing cognitive
biases, providing effective advice, and building regulatory structures that
will promote those objectives.
To design those structures will also require more systematic information
about what works in the world. We know that many legal employers have
institutionalized ethics education and ethics committees. What we do not
know is whether these initiatives demonstrably affect ethical conduct. To
the extent that evaluation occurs, it generally involves asking participants to
rate their satisfaction with an educational experience.1 12 It would be far
more useful to know whether they do anything differently as a result.
Similar inquiries should focus on corporate governance systems and
legislative reforms such as the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements. We cannot
improve the climate for moral counseling without a broader base of
knowledge and more effective efforts to convey it in educational settings.
Finally, we need more public accountability for professional
performance. Obvious though this point seems, it is widely rejected in the
legal community. Whenever the prospect arises, the banner of professional
independence is unfurled. The post-Enron skirmishes between
governmental policy makers and the organized bar are no exception.' 13 In
warning lawyers not to capitulate to public calls for reform, Lawrence Fox
insists, "We are not in the business to win Miss Congeniality awards."' 14
My reading of the polls suggests no danger on that score. We could,
however, aim to win more public confidence that we are satisfying our own
ethical standards. As the preamble to the ABA Model Rules notes, the
lawyer is not only a representative of clients, but "an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice."1 5 This sometimes entails giving advice that is not what the client
wants, but is rather what the client needs and the public deserves. More
attorneys need to take that obligation seriously in practice as well as
principle.
11. Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 200 (quoting William Simon, The
Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. Legal Educ. 65, 66 (1991)); see also Vischer, supra note 84,
at 271 (arguing for a fuller discussion of the moral implications of legal practice in law
school).
112. Trevifio & Weaver, supra note 97, at 339.
113. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
114. Lawrence J. Fox, The Fallout from Enron: Media Frenzy and Misguided Notions of
Public Relations Are No Reason to Abandon Our Commitment to Our Clients, 2003 U. I11. L.
Rev. 1243, 1247.
115. Model Rules of Prof I Conduct pmbl. (2004).
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For that to happen, more public and governmental involvement is
necessary in the design of bar regulatory standards and enforcement
structures. Given all the cognitive biases noted earlier, no occupational
group, however well intentioned, can fully appreciate the points at which
societal and professional interests diverge. We do not lack for constructive
proposals to increase lawyers' accountability. 116 The challenge lies in
building a constituency that demands them.
In Jean Renoir's searing film The Rules of the Game, the comic
philosopher Octave suggests that "the one thing which is terrible," and
accounts for so much misery in the world, is that "everyone has their own
good reasons."117 Lawyers have many. For all their lapses in moral
counseling, attorneys generally have a justification. What they may not
have, however, is the capacity to recognize their own tunnel vision and the
self-serving biases that make personal expedience seem professionally
defensible. External perspectives are critical. Part of our professional
responsibility is to identify strategies for enlisting them. Occasions like this
Symposium are a useful contribution to that process and a reminder of our
own responsibilities in the effort.
116. For a sample, see Rhode, Interests of Justice, supra note 18, at 161-65, and Deborah
L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: A Comparative Perspective on Access to Legal
Services and Accountability of the Legal Profession, 56 Current Legal 93 (2003).
117. Jean Renoir, Rules of the Game 53 (John McGrath & Maureen Teitelbaum trans.,
1997).
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